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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN THE CANCELLATION
OF AIR MAIL ROUTE CERTIFICATES
ERNEST HowARD CAMPBELL
(Continued from July Issue)
VII PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE CANCELLATION ORDER
One of the most controverted questions presented by the air mail
litigation was whether the constitutional requirements of procedural
due process embraced by the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Constitu-
tion were offended by the failure of the Postmaster General to afford
notice and hearing to the holders of the air mail route certificates involved
prior to the issuance of the wholesale and summary cancellation order
The three opinions of members of the Court of Claims in Pacific Air
Transport et al v United States, supra, do not even take cognizance
of this question Yet it would seem that this question deserves careful
and critical consideration and examination
In approaching the question of which method could or should have
been invoked, it should be remembered that the primary reasons as-
signed by Farley for the cancellation of the certificates were: (1) Pay-
ment of excessive compensation to the holders of air mail route cer-
tificates for the transportation of air mail (2) The allocation of air
mail route certificates to a few large corporations contrary to the con-
gressional intent (3) Participation in the so-called May-June Spoils
Conferences of 1930 and the alleged agreement made at these conferences
to apportion and divide territory and the consequent elimination of
competitive bidding It is clear that at the time of the cancellation of
the air mail route certificates both the President and the Postmaster
General were invested with broad discretionary powers to cancel air
mail route certificates independent of any collusion, fraud, agreement
to prevent competitive bidding, or unlawful conduct of any sort on the
part of the holders of the air mail route certificates in the acquisition
of such certificates Even when such certificates have been lawfully
acquired, the public interest at a later date may require their cancella-
tion
In canceling the air mail route certificates, Postmaster General Farley
relied upon Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
and upon "the general powers of the Postmaster General"
While the term "due process" is not susceptible of specific definition
and courts have preferred to define it only when presented with con-
crete cases, the United States Supreme Court has defined "due process"
as being in the language of Mr Webster:
"'the general law, a law which hears before it condemns,
PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
which proceeds upon inquiry, and renders judgment only after
trial '8
The principle has been established by the Supreme Court of the United
States that under any grant of power, whether statutory or general,
and whether notice and hearing are specified in such grant or not, such
power depriving persons of property pursuant to a quasi-judicial deter-
mination by an administrative body can only be exercised pursuant to
the constitutional requirements of prior notice and hearing, save per-
haps in certain matters involving the exercise of the police power The
courts customarily read these constitutional requirements into grants
of administrative power in order to sustain the constitutionality of
such grants Were it not for such necessary implication, the grant itself,
as well as many acts performed under the terms thereof, would be
unconstitutional and void 79
Since Connecticut General Life Insurance v Johnson,0 it is significant
that the due process clause has not been invoked to declare legislation
unconstittuional affecting property rights However, since 1937 sub-
stantive due process has been frequently employed to hold invalid
invasions of civil liberties While substantive due process has been
substantially narrowed in the scope of its operation, procedural due
process still remains with undiminished force I"
Notice and an opportunity to be heard, granted to those whose life,
liberty, or property are affected by governmental prerogative, have
always been of the essence of procedural due process The Bill of
Rights of the Federal Constitution contains fundamental law limitations
upon the power of the government, legislative, as well as executive and
judicial It has been recognized that the postal power, like all other
powers of the federal government, is subject to the limitations of the
Bill of Rights 8 2
In Lipke v Lederer,83 in which the Supreme Court of the United
States held that an injunction should issue against the Collector of
Internal Revenue who threatened to seize property in collection of
taxes assessed on the ground that he failed to accord an opportunity
for hearing upon notice to the person whose property was thus attempted
summarily to be disposed of, the Collector of Internal Revenue pur-
78 Ex parte Wall, 107 U S 265, 289 (1882); Dartmouth College v Wood-
ward, 4 Wheat 519, 4 L ed 629 (1819); T. M COOLEY, 2 CoNsTITUTIoNAL
LIMITATIONS, Boston, Little, Brown & Co (1927) 736
79 Southern Railway Co v Virginia, 290 U S 190, 54 Sup Ct 148; 78 L
ed 260 (1933)
80303 U S 77, 58 Sup Ct 436, 82 L ed 873 (1938)
81BENTJAMN F WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMtWOcAw CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW,
Boston, Houghton VMiffin Co (1942) 223, 240.82 Burton v United States, 202 U S 344, 26 Sup Ct 688, 50 L ed 1057(1906).
83 259 U. S 557, 562, 42 Sup Ct. 549, 66 L ed 1061 (1921); See: Smith
v Foster (S D, N Y), 15 F (2d) 115 (1926)
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ported to act under the National Prohibition Act, which empowered
him to make such seizure, but which contained no specific reference to the
constitutional requirement of notice and hearing The claim of adverse
interest of the United States did not serve to prevent the Court from
directing the issuance of the injunction The Supreme Court stated:
"Section 35 prescribes no definite mode for enforcing the
imposition which it directs Before collection of taxes
levied by statutes enacted in plain pursuance of the taxing
power can be enforced, the taxpayer must be given fair oppor-
tunity for hearing-this is essential to due process of law
Certainly we cannot conclude, in the absence of language ad-
mitting of no other construction, that Congress intended that
penalties for crime should be enforced through the secret find-
ings and summary action of executive officers"
In Ochoa v Hernandes y Morales,84 the United States Supreme Court,
speaking through Justice Pitney, pointed out that notice and an
opportunity for hearing are the rock bottom foundations of due process
The Court stated:
"Without the guaranty of 'due process' the right of private
property cannot be said to exist, in the sense in which it is
known to our laws The principle known to the common law
before Magna Carta, was embodied in that charter (Coke, 2
Inst 45, 50) and has been recognized since the Revolution as
among the safest foundations of our institutions Whatever
also may be said about the definition of the term 'due process
of law,' all authorities agree that it inhibits the taking of one
man's property and giving it to another, contrary to settled
usages and modes of procedure, and without notice or an
opportunity for a hearing"
In Interstate Commerce Commission v Louisville and Nashville Rail-
road Company,85 the Court observed:
"In the comparatively few cases in which such questions
have arisen, it has been distinctly recognized that administra-
tive orders, quasi-judicial in character, are void if a hearing was
denied; if that granted was inadequate or manifestly unfair;
if the finding was contrary to the 'indisputable character of
the evidence' " (Italics supplied)
In Unity School of Christianity v Federal Radio Commission," the
Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia reversed a decision of the
Federal Radio Commission terminating the existing radio station license
of appellant, holding that:
"It was the duty of the Commission before decision to notify
WOQ, whose very existence was involved, and afford that sta-
tion an opportunity to be heard; otherwise, there would be a
denial of due process The findings in the present case
have been made without notice, the decision must be set aside
84 230 U S 130 161, 33 Sup Ct 1033 57 L ed. 1247 (1912)
81227 U S 88. 91, 33 Sup Ct 185, 57 L ed 431 (1912)
"0 64 F (2d) 550, 551-52 (1933)
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and the case remanded, to the end that a proper hearing be
had before the Commission"
The case of Garfield v United States ex rel Goldsby,87 was an action
for a writ of mandamus against the Secretary of the Interior to compel
him to restore the enrollment of complainant as a member of an Indian
nation carrying with it the right to allotment of tribal lands The en-
rollment of complainant had been canceled by the Secretary of the
Interior without prior notice and hearing In affirming the judgment
of the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia which required
the Secretary to recognize the complainant as an enrolled member of
the nation, the Supreme Court stated:
" it has always been recognized that one who has acquired
rights by an administrative or judicial proceeding cannot be
deprived of them without notice and an opportunity to be
heard
"The right to be heard before property is taken or rights and
privileges withdrawn, which have been previously legally
awarded, is of the very essence of due process of law It is
unnecessary to recite the decisions in which this principle has
been repeatedly recognized It is enough to say that its bind-
ing obligation has never been questioned in this court"
It is recognized that the law does not always require notice and hear-
ing prior to an administrative determination, nor is it necessary that
all persons affected by such a determination be afforded notice and an
opportunity to be heard This is true in the making of quasi-legislative
as distinguished from quasi-judicial determinations, and in certain
situations involving an exercise of the police power, but the cancellation
of the air mail route certificates by the Postmaster General did not
constitute either a quasi-legislative determination or an exercise of
police power These principles are illustrated by the following cases:
In Spokane Hotel Company v Younger,88 the Supreme Court of
Washington held that under Remington Code, Section 6571-1, the
Industrial Welfare Commission may fix wages for women without giving
notice to employers and an opportunity to be heard, for the reason that
such administrative action is within the police power, and is not un-
constitutional as depriving perscns of life, liberty, and property without
due process of law The Court stated that this was an administrative
and not a judicial determination, and the legislature could have done
the same thing without notice and hearing, so the administrative body
may do so also since there is no statutory provision requiring notice and
hearing The Court observed that if personal notice must be given to
employers before a minimum wage and working conditions may be
established by the legislature or by a commission appointed for that
purpose, then such a law could not be made, because it would be almost,
87211 U. S. 249 262, 29 Sup Ct 62. 53 L ed 168 (1908)
88 113 Wash? 359, 194 Pac 595 (1920)
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if not utterly impossible, to notify every employer of such labor within
the state Moreover the Court held employers have no vested right to
employ women and children, and therefore employers are not entitled
to notice as a matter of right
In State ex rel State Board of Milk Control v Newark Milk Com-
pany, 9 the fixing of minimum prices by the New Jersey Milk Control
Board without notice and hearing to the defendant milk company, was
held not to invade defendant's constitutional rights under the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution
The Court stated that in the absence of specific constitutional or statu-
tory requirement therefor, notice of proceedings before a subordinate
body exercising an administrative function, is not a prerequisite to
valid action by that body, nor is a hearing required in the absence of
a provision therefor in the organic or statutory law The Court stated:
" the respondent board merely exercises the administra-
tive function to effectuate the definitely declared legislative
policy Such regulation is purely a legislative function; and,
even when exercised by a subordinate body, upon which it is
conferred, the notice of hearing essential in judicial proceedings
is not indispensable to a valid exercise of the power" (Italics
supplied)
In Commonwealth v Sissen,90 the Court held the Board of Fish and
Game Commissioners, in exercising power delegated to it by statute of
determining whether the fish of a brook or stream are of sufficient value
to warrant the prohibition or regulation of the discharge of sawdust
therein, and of prohibiting and regulating its discharge if so warranted,
is acting in a legislative and not in a judicial capacity, and need not
base its action on sworn evidence or give a hearing to a person request-
ing it, whose sawmill is injuriously affected by its action
In Bi-Metallic Investment Company v State Board of Equalization
of Colorado,91 the Court held an order of the State Board of Equalization
of Colorado which increased the valuation of taxable property in the
80118 N J Eq 504 179 Atl 116, 125-26 (1935) Cf Miami Laundry Co
v Florida Dry Cleaning and Laundry Board 134 Fla 1 183 So 759 (1938),
which contains dicta to the effect that regulations promulgated by an
administrative board including that of price-fixing, must, in the interest
of the public be done in strict compilance with the requirement of law
with reference to notice and hearing
90 189 Mass. 247, 75 N E 619 (1905) To the same effect see: Bragg v
Weaver 251 U S 57 58, 40 Sup Ct 62, 64 L ed 135 (1919), in which the
United States Supreme Court observed, regarding the exercise of the
power of eminent domain: "Where the intended use is public the necessity
and expediency of the taking may be determined by such agency and in
such mode as the State may designate They are legislative questions, no
matter who may be charged with their decision, and a hearing thereon
is not essential to due process in the sense of the Fourteenth Amendment"
The Court concluded that the right to a hearing upon appeal upon the
question of the adequacy of compensation for property taken pursuant to
eminent domain proceedings satisfies the requirements of due process
911239 U S 441, 36 Sup Ct 141, 60 L ed 372 (1915)
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City of Denver 40 per cent without notice and hearing to the taxpayers
or assessing officers of Denver before the order was made, was not in
violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution of the United States In making this ruling, the Court,
speaking through the late Justice Holmes, pointed out that in the event
a rule of conduct applies to more than a few individuals, it is im-
practicable that everyone should have a direct voice in its adoption;
that there is no constitutional requirement that all public acts be done
in town meeting or in an assembly of the whole; and that there must
be a limit to individual argument in such matters if government is to
go on The Court distinguished this case from Londoner v City and
County of Denver,9 2 which held that in the event the legislature com-
mits the determination of the tax to a subordinate body, due process
of law under the Fourteenth Amendment requires that the taxpayer
must be afforded a hearing of which he must have had notice, on the
ground that a local board had to determine whether and in what amount
and upon whom a tax for paving a street should be levied for special
benefits Only a relatively small number of persons who were excep-
tionally affected were involved
In Nickey v Mississipp,9 3 the Court held there is no constitutional
command that notice of the assessment be given in advance of the
assessment; it is enough that all available defenses may be presented
to a competent tribunal before the exaction of the tax and before the
command of the state to pay becomes final and irrevocable
For the protection of public health, a state may order summary
destruction by administrative authorities without antecedent notice and
hearing Because of public necessity, the property of citizens may be
summarily seized in war time 14
The foregoing cases illustrate that notice and hearing are not always
prerequisites to procedural due process; they also demonstrate that the
cases are in conflict in a measure with respect to whether or not notice
and hearing are essential conditions precedent to an administrative
determination Yet it should be observed that all of the above cases
are differently circumstanced from those arising out of the cancellation
of the air mail route certificates and are in nowise controlling with re-
spect to them for the reason that neither the promulgation of the can-
cellation order itself nor the effects which resulted therefrom were
quasi-legislative in character
The federal government frequently provides in its contracts that
the "contract may be terminated by the government in whole or in
92 210 U. S 373, 28 Sup Ct 708, 52 L. ed 1103 (1908).
,3292 U S 393, 54 Sup Ct 743, 78 L ed. 1323 (1934)
9, North American Cold Storage Co v City of Chicago, 211 U S 306,
29 Sup Ct. 101, 53 L ed 195 (1908); Central Union Trust Co v Garvan, 254
U S 554, 41 Sup Ct 214, 65 L ed 403 (1921)
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part by written notice whenever the contracting officer shall determine
that termination is for the best interest of the government" However,
there was no language of this sort in the air mail contracts or route
certificates
While breach of contract by the government may not satisfy the
highest moral canon, the government may breach a contract and then
respond in damages in the same manner as a private citizen, provided
the government consents to be sued It must be remembered, however,
that we are dealing here with something more than an alleged breach
of contract The invocation of Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes
of the United States, and the involuntary retirement of executives of
American commercial air lines from the American air transport industry
who had participated in the alleged May-June, 1930, Spoils Conferences,
was tantamount to the imposition of a fine or criminal penalty upon
the executives of the air carriers affected It is elementary that alleged
fraud, which was one of the primary reasons for the issuance of the
cancellation order, is never presumed, but must be established by clear,
cogent, and convincing evidence In addition, one is presumed to be
innocent until he has been proved guilty It is therefore at once apparent
that the right to notice and hearing must be read into Section 395011
of the Revised Statutes of the United States before the penalties pre-
scribed by this statute are meted out This is essentially the position
which was taken by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia in Boeing Air Transport, Inc v Farley," but then the
Court emasculated that determination by holding there was an adequate
remedy at law in the Court of Claims Likewise it would seem that the
requirement of notice and hearing would have to be read into Section
1846 of the Postal Laws and Regulations in the event this section were
invoked to cancel air mail route certificates In the event of conflict
between the provisions of Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes and the
Watres Act regarding the requirement of notice and hearing, it would
appear that the provisions of the Watres Act, a much later statute and
the governing statute relating to air mail route certificates at the time
of the cancellation and which specifically prescribed forty-five (45)
days' notice and hearing prior to cancellation, must control The terms
of the air mail route certificates are quite comparable to an agreement
providing for the submission of differences and disputes to arbitration
in respect to which courts have held that a demand or offer to arbitrate
a dispute is a condition precedent to the maintenance of a suit on a con-
11 Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (39 U S
C A § 432) was enacted on June 8 1872 (17 Stat. 283 314) An examina-
tion of all of the decisions rendered which involved § 3950 prior to the
cancellation of the air mail route certificates, discloses that none of those
decisions involved the question of notice and hearing prior to meting out
the penalties prescribed by this statute
1164 App Div 162, 75 F (2d) 765 (1935)
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tract which provides for a submission of differences arising under the
contract to arbitration 97
Both by virtue of the covenants in the air mail route certificates and
by virtue of the provisions of germane statutes respecting notice and
hearing, notice and hearing were essential conditions precedent to lawful
administrative action to effect cancellation of the air mail route cer-
tificates The government not only covenanted not to cancel air mail
route certificates prior to according notice and an opportunity to be
heard to the holders of the route certificates but also the applicable
statutes clearly demonstrate that it was the intention and command of
Congress that the air mail route certificates should not be canceled with-
out prior notice and hearing to the holders of the certificates Therefore
the ex parte findings of Farley and the issuance of the ex parte cancella-
tion order, a quasi-judicial determination, based thereon, without prior
notice and hearing, violated the constitutional guaranties embraced by
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution 1s
VIII THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF FINDINGS OF HEADS OF EXECUTIvE
DEPARTMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENT
A second important question raised by the air mail litigation is whether
the findings of heads of executive departments are conclusive
There is considerable decisional support for the proposition that the
findings of the heads of executive departments are conclusive and should
not be upset Therefore, it has been contended that in the absence of
a showing that Postmaster General Farley was clearly acting arbitrarily,
the court should treat his findings of fact, to-wit, that there was col-
lusion and fraud in the awarding of the air mail route certificates so
as to eliminate competitive bidding, as conclusive
The quantum of judicial review of the findings of an administrative
body often depends in a large measure upon the language of the statute
providing for judicial review under which an administrative body oper-
ates Some of the criteria employed in the judicial review of admin-
istrative findings are:
(1) That the determination of the administrative body shall be con-
clusive if supported by substantial evidence;
(2) That it shall be presumed to be prima facie correct;
97 Zindorf Cont Co v Western American Co, 27 Wash 31, 67 Pac 374
(1901); Winsor v German Savings & Loan Society, 31 Wash 365. 72 Pac.
66 (1903); Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co v Purcell Safe Co, 81 Wash 592,
142 Pac. 1153 (1914); judgment affirmed on rehearing 86 Wash 694 150 Pac
1162 (1915); Calhoun, Denny and Ewing v Pederson, 85 Wash 630, 149 Pac.
25 (1915)
9" Cases such as United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co, Inc, 310 U S
150, 60 Sup Ct 811, 84 L ed 1129 (1940), which held agreements to fix
prices in interstate commerce are unlawful per se under the Sherman Act,
do not support the denial of notice and hearing prior to the cancellation of
the air mail route certificates
1946]
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(3) That it shall be conclusive in the absence of arbitrary and capri-
cious action, and
(4) That upon appeal litigant shall be entitled to a trial de novo
One of the most controverted contemporary phases of judicial review
concerns the weight and finality that should attach to the findings of
an administrative body The United States Supreme Court, speaking
through the late Justice Brandeis, has stated that it has long been
settled that determinations of fact for ordinary administrative purposes
are not subject to review " Courts have no power to interfere unless
there was either a denial of a hearing' 0 or the finding was not supported
by evidence, 10 or an erroneous rule of law was applied 102 It may be
said with measurable assurance that only when the administrative
process is conducted with competent personnel and in a lawful manner,
can it be expected that courts will not find formulas to deprive admin-
istrative determinations of finality True, the Interstate Commerce
Commission, especially during its early years, lost a number of cases
in the Supreme Court of the United States, but on the whole, its record
for being sustained in the courts is very good, thus demonstrating that
administrative determinations will be sustained upon appeal to the
courts if they are judiciously and painstakingly made
We now consider two cases which illustrate the great deference which
the United States Supreme Court has accorded to administrative action
of the Post Office Department, particularly in situations in which the
exercise of administrative discretion is involved
In the case of National Life Insurance Company of the United States
of America v National Life Insurance Company,10 3 the firm names
were very similar, and one firm claimed that most of the mail belonged
to it, and hence should be delivered to it The Post Office Department
issued an order to the effect that the mail so addressed should be de-
livered to the one which adopted the name first In contesting this
ruling of the Post Office Department, the Court stated that the com-
plainant was really appealing from the discretion of the Post Office
Department to the discretion of the Court, and the Court refused to
interfere, stating:
"A court in such case ought not to interfere in the admin-
istration of a great department like that of the Post Office by
an injunction, which directs the department how to conduct
Phillips v Commissioner of Internal Revenue 283 U S 589, 51 Sup Ct
608, 75 L ed 1289 (1931)
100 Chin Yow v United States, 208 U S 8 28 Sup Ct 201, 52 L ed 369
(1908)
101 American School of Magnetic Healing v McAnnulty, 187 U S 94,
23 Sup Ct 33 47 L ed. 90 (1902)102 Ng Fung Ho v White, 259 U S 276, 42 Sup Ct 492, 66 L ed. 938
(1922)
10- 209 U S 317, 325, 326, 28 Sup Ct 17 49 L ed 147 (1908)
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the business thereof, where the party asking for the injunction
has no clear right to it"
In United States ex rel Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing
Company v Burleson, Postmaster General of the United States,'10 4 the
Court sustained the action of the Third Assistant Postmaster General
in revoking, after notice and hearing, the second-class mail privilege
granted the relator on the ground that it contained articles which were
violative of the Espionage Act The Court stated:
" there remains the question of whether substantial evi-
dence to support his order may be found in the facts stated in
the Postmaster General's answer, which are admitted by the
demurrer, for the law is, that the conclusion of the head of an
executive department of the government on such a question,
when within his jurisdiction, will not be disturbed by the
courts, unless they are clearly of the opinion that it is wrong"
However, as has already been noted, in certain cases courts have
not hesitated to set aside indefensible findings and determinations of
heads of executive departments of the federal government Even though
the act of annulment involved a discretionary act, it would seem that
the courts may set aside an order of the Postmaster General if either
procedural due process or existing statutory law requires that the parties
affected by such an order be accorded notice and hearing prior to the
issuance of the order
In view of the fact that the right to cross-examine, the opportunity
to be heard, the right to present witnesses, the right to have findings
made, and the right to have an order entered based upon findings, were
not accorded to the holders of the air mail route certificates prior to
the making of findings and the issuance of the cancellation order by
the Postmaster General, the constitutional requirements of due process
were not satisfied in the preparation of the findings of the Postmaster
General and the entry of the cancellation order
There cannot be too great interference with the heads of executive
departments of the federal governmental establishment for the functions
of the government must not be unduly impeded, but the findings of
administrative officials should satisfy the constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process If notice and hearing were essential con-
ditions precedent to the preparation of the findings of the Postmaster
General and to the issuance of the cancellation order, courts should
not hesitate to go behind the factual determination of the Postmaster
General, even though the issuance of the order involved the exercise
of administrative discretion, and to set aside the findings and cancella-
tion order of the Postmaster General when they are framed in com-
plete disregard of the constitutional requirements of due process
255 U S 407, 413, 41 Sup Ct 352, 60 L ed. 704 (1921)
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IX THE SCOPE o GOVERNMENTAL IMmuNrry
A third important question raised by the air mail litigation is the
extent to which the government and its agents are amenable to suit
In their actions in the constitutional courts the air transport companies
did not seek damages against Farley or the government, but brought
bills in equity for injunctive relief, insisted that the damages they were
sustaining were irreparable, and that there was no adequate remedy
at law However, the efforts to obtain injunctive relief proved abortive
The courts refused to pass upon the question of the right to injunctive
relief for the reason that the federal government arid one of its agents,
Farley, were considered to be the parties defendant We now inquire
into the soundness of this ruling
The rule that no state can be sued without its consent is well estab-
lished in the law 105 This doctrine is premised on two quite distinct
considerations: First, that the state is sovereign Second, that the courts
will not interfere with the process of government by controlling dis-
cretionary acts of officials Hence, in the event objection is raised that
a given suit is one against the state, it is necessary to determine whether
it is directed against the sovereign as such, or is one which involves
interference with executive discretion
Was the sovereign sued in the air mail cases? If it had been the
nominal party defendant, obviously it would have been Yet, since it
was not named as a party defendant, the question is presented as to
whether or not the government of the United States had such an interest
in the outcome that the suits were in reality against it A direct property
right in the subject of the controversy is such an interest 106 If the
effect of a decree would be to enforce specific performance against the
103 Monaco v Mississippi, 292 U S 313, 321, 54 Sup Ct 745 78 L ed 1282
(1934), held the United States Supreme Court has no jurisdiction of a suit
brought by a foreign state, namely the principality of Monaco, against a
state of the Union without her consent
At the time the Federal CQnstitution was adopted, it was the clear under-
standing of the advocates of the Federal Union that the individual states
would not thereby be subjected against their will to the suits of individuals.
This view applied with even greater force to the central government
Alexander Hamilton shared the view that a state could not be made
amenable to suit without its consent for the reason that such exemption
was inherent in the nature of sovereignty (THE FEDERALIST, New York M.
Walter Duane (1901) 81, 125, 126 ) James Madison and John Marshall held
the same view, and thus the immunity of the state was assumed as a matter
of course (R D WATKmS, TkM STATE AS A PARTY LrrIGA=T, Baltimore,
The John Hopkins Press (1921) 50 ) Following the pronouncement of the
contrary view in Chisholm v Georgia, 2 Dall 419, 1 L ed. 440 (1793),
the Eleventh Amendment to the Federal Constitution was quickly proposed
and unanimously adopted, providing that the judicial power of the United
States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity com-
menced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of
another state
100 Belknap v Schild, 161 U. S 10, 16 Sup Ct 443, 40 L ed. 599 (1896);
Oregon v Hitchcock, 202 U S 60, 26 Sup. Ct. 568, 50 L ed 935 (1906);
United States ex reL Goldberg v Daniels, 231 U S 218 34 Sup CL 84, 58
L ed 191 (1913)
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state, the suit cannot be maintained It will be recalled that it was on
this ground that relief was denied in Transcontinental and Western Air
Lines, Inc v Farley,07 in the Southern District Court of New York;
the United States was held to be an indispensable party if one of the
agents of the government is alleged to be acting outside the scope of his
authority The Court held the plaintiff company could not obtain spe-
cific performance of its contract against the United States and interfere
with the process of government without at least making it a party, and
since no consent to be sued had been granted by the government, the
suit could not be maintained
In the actions for injunctive relief, the air transport companies asserted
they did not ask that the payment for their services be authorized; that
the mail be delivered to their airplanes; or that they be assured of
specific performance of the contracts or route certificates They prayed
merely that defendant Farley be enjoined from unlawfully interfering
with their contract with the United States Counsel for the air trans-
port companies distinguished Wells v Roper,08 which had been relied
upon by defendant, on the ground that it is limited to the proposition
that an official of the United States may not be enjoined when acting
"solely in his official capacity and within the scope of his duties "101
It is clear that courts have treated cases of this nature as attempts to
secure specific performance and as suits againt the United States Never-
theless, it would seem that even though the United States has a property
interest in the mails,"10 when arbitrary action on the part of an executive
officer is in issue, and there is a prima facie showing that he acted out-
side the scope of his authority, and when no prior notice and hearing
are provided before taking administrative action of a quasi-judicial
character, then the argument that the one seeking relief would in
effect thereby cause the government specifically to perform its contract,
should not preclude the court from passing on the merits of the case,
and restraining the arbitrary and unlawful administrative action, if it
finds it to obtain or to be threatened
In Delaware Railroad Company v Weeks, Secretary of War,'" in
a suit by a railroad against the Secretary of War and the engineer in
charge of improvements in a canal to enjoin the removal of a bridge
and threatened criminal prosecution, it was held not to be a suit against
107 71 F (2d) 288 (1934)
108246 U S 335, 38 Sup Ct 317, 62 L ed 755 (1918)
100 Boeing Air Transport, Inc, et al v Farley (C A, Dist of Col),
75 F (2d) 765 (1935)
e I r& Debs, 158 U S 564, 15 Sup Ct 900, 39 L ed 1092 (1895)
111 293 Fed 114 (D. C, Del) (1923) In United States v Clarke, 8 Pet
436, 8 L ed 1001 (1834), the Court, speaking through Chief Justice Marshall,
stated that the United States was not suable of common right, and unless
the plaintiff could bring his suit within the terms of some permissible act
of Congress, the Court could not entertain it
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the United States, and the complainants were held entitled to invoke
the protection of the federal district court
In Magruder v Belle Fourche Valley Water Users' Association,1 "
a suit was instituted against executive officers of the United States to
enjoin them from unlawfully diverting water in alleged violation of
law, to the irreparable injury of the property rights of the plaintiff It
was held that this was not a suit against the United States, nor that it,
or the injunction sought, objectionable, either on the ground that they
interfere with the property or the possession of the property of the
United States, or on the ground that they compel specific performance
of its contracts
The concept of the non-suability of the state was one of the prime
reasons for the institution of the Court of Claims of the United States
In the early days, if one had a claim against the United States, he
simply went to Congress and presented his claim to the appropriate
committee in Congress It was allowed or disallowed, and that practice
continued for many years Obviously, even if a court were to assume
jurisdiction, one could not levy execution against the United States
This was a very undesirable system; Congress was overburdened with
matters of private concern that required judicial investigation rather
than legislation No one had any assurance that just claims would be
paid, or that unjust and spurious claims would be detected, or if detected,
would be rejected It was not until February 24, 1855, that Congress
created the Court of Claims, thereby permitting the government to be
sued in certain specified cases The inability of the holders of the air
mail route certificates to obtain injunctive relief in this forum before
their alleged damage had been sustained, made them consider this forum
as far from adequate for their needs
With the marked extension of governmental activity into fields
hitherto regarded, at least in countries with the common law tradition,
as within the province of private enterprise, the conflict of government
with private interest has been greatly accentuated and has demonstrated
the necessity of giving fresh consideration to the whole subject of
governmental immunity 'I8
There is a growing torrent of criticism of the doctrine of non-suability
of the state in Anglo-American jurisdictions It has been forecast that
we shall see increasing encroachment in countries of English law u p6
the hitherto sacred domain of sovereign non-responsibility, and an ap-
proach to the continental theory of responsibility of the moder' sov-
ereign in its own courts
"That the absolute immunity of the sovereign from direct
personal suit abroad, save with its consent, will probably en-
t12 219 Fed 72 (C C A) (1914)
118Ernest Angell, Sovereign Immun ty-The Modern Trend (1925-26)
35 YALE L J 150
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dure for many years; but the immunity of the sovereign from
suit at home is being weakened by legislative consent, by the
critical onslaught of writers, and by the growing disfavor to-
ward the doctrine in thb courts ",,14
The present general trend of congressional opinion is to extend the
area within which the government is amenable to suit This is frequently
accomplished through the insertion of the key words "to sue and be
sued" in the statute which creates a governmental agency The case of
Keifer and Keifer v Reconstruction Finance Corp ,115 certainly demon-
strates this trend In holding a Regional Agricultural Credit Corpora-
tion, chartered by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation by authority
of Section 201(e) of the Emergency Relief and Construction Act of
1932, subject to suit, Justice Frankfurter, speaking for the Court, ob-
served:'
"Because of the advantages enjoyed by the corporate device
ompared with conventional executive agencies, the exigencies
of war and the enlarged scope of government in economic
affairs have greatly extended the use of independent corporate
facil.iiies for governmental ends In spawning these corpora-
tions during the past two decades, Congress has uniformly in-
cluded amenability to law Congress has provided for not less
than forty of such corporations discharging governmental func-
tions, and without exception, the authority to-sue-and-be-sued
was included. Such a firm practice is partly an indication of
the present climate of opinion which has brought govern-
mental immunity from suit into disfavor, partly it reveals a
definite, attitude on the part of Congress which should be
given hospitable scope"
JuRIsDICTION oF CouRTs To RESTRAIN ACTS OF GOVERNMENTAL
Ol'FICERS WHICH FALL OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF THEm AUTHORITY
The United State Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld the prin-
ciple that the government can only act within the limits prescribed by
the Constitution One of these limits is that no person shall be deprived
of liberty or property without due process of law Ever since Marbury
v Madison,'" it has been established that the function of confining the
activities of the respective branches of the government within the limits
defined in the Constitution is a function of the judicial branch
Under the doctrine of the supremacy of law, and its corollary, that
of the responsibility of governmental agents to the law, any official who
transcends the authority with which he is clothed by the law, becomes
re.sponsible for his wrongful act; he is amenable to the authority of
the ordinary courts, and the ordinary courts have jurisdiction to deter-
mine what is the extent of his legal power and whether the orders under
which he has acted were legal and valid
•x Ibid 151-53
306 U S 381, 390, 391, 59 Sup. Ct 516, 83 L ed 784 (1939)
10 1 Cranch 137, 2 L ed 60 (1803)
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"Broadly speaking any official who exceeds the authority
given him by the law incurs a personal responsibility at com-
mon law for his act, and is amenable to the authority of the
ordinary courts of justice That principle is one of the foun-
dations of administration according to law "I"
The United States Supreme Court has stated the basic principle that
the function of the courts is to enforce the constitutional limitations
against governmental agents, as follows:
Arbitrary power, enforcing its edicts to the injury of
the persons and property of its subjects, is not law, whether
manifested as the decree of a personal monarch or of an im-
personal multitude The enforcement of these limitations
by judicial process is the device of self-governing communities
to protect the rights of individuals and minorities as well
against the powers of numbers as against the violence of public
agents transcending the limits of lawful authority, even when
acting in the name and wielding the force of government "1118
(Italics supplied)
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly applied this doc-
trine It has frequently affirmed and directed the issuance of injunc-
tions to restrain cabinet officers and their subordinates from the com-
mission of acts which are violative of constitutional prohibitions or
otherwise unauthorized by law 19
In Noble v Union River Logging Railroad Company, 10 the Secretary
of the Interior had issued an order revoking a right of way over public
lands granted to the railroad by defendant's predecessor in office The
railroad brought a bill in equity to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior
from executing the order and molesting the plaintiff in the enjoyment
of his right of way The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia
granted the injunction and the United States Supreme Court affirmed it,
holding that the Secretary of the Interior's purported order of revocation
was void because it was an attempt to deprive the plaintiff of its property
without due process of law, and was therefore beyond the scope of his
authority The Court held that the rule that mandamus would lie to
enforce performance of ministerial duties
"applies to a case wherein it is contended that the act of
the Head of a Department, under any view that can be taken
of the facts that were laid before him, was ultra vires and
beyond the scope of his authority If he has no power at all
to do the act complained of, he is as much subject to an in-
117 WILLIA1 A ROBSON, JUSTICE AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW, London, Mac-
millan & Co (1928) 55
I'sHurtado v California 110 U S 516, 536, 4 Sup Ct 111, 28 L ed 232
(1884); A V DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF LAW OF THE CONSTrru-
TION London, Macmillan & Co, 8th ed (1915) 193, 194, 202 203; JOHN
DICKINSON, ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW, Cambridge
Harvard University Press (1927) 32 et seq
"" Goltra v Weeks 271 U S 536, 544, 46 Sup Ct 102, 70 L ed 404 (1926)
12_o147 U S 165, 13 Sup Ct 271 37 L ed 123 (1892)
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junction as he would be to a mandamus if he refused to do an
act which the law plainly required him to do 11121.
In American School of Magnetic Healing v MacAnnulty, 22 the
Postmaster General, after hearing the school, made a determination of
fraudulent use of the mails "upon evidence satisfactory to him," and
forbade the local postmaster to pay any postal money orders drawn
to the order of the school The Postmaster General purported to act
by authority of certain congressional statutes providing for the sup-
pression of lottery traffic The Supreme Court held that the local
postmaster should be restrained from carrying out the order of the
Postmaster General because the determination and order of the Post-
Master General were not authorized by the statute pursuant to which
he purported to act, despite the fact that he gave plaintiffs a hearing
upon notice before his determination
The Court restated the principle of responsibility of the administrative
officers to the law, in language of a similar character to that of Robson,
supra:
"That the conduct of the post office is a part of the admin-
istrative department of the government is entirely true, but
that does not necessarily and always oust the courts of jurisdic-
tion to grant relief to a party aggrieved by any action by the
head or one of the subordinate officials of that department
which is authorized by the statute under which he assumes to
act The acts of all of its officers must be justified by some
law, and in case an official violates the law to the injury of an
individual, the courts generally have jurisdiction to grant
relief
"Otherwise, the individual is left to the absolutely uncon-
trolled and arbitrary action of a public and administrative
officer, whose action is unauthorized by any law, and is in viola-
tion of the rights of the individual ,._3 (Italics supplied)
It is clear that the doctrine of sovereign immunity from suit protects
only those acts of governmental agents which are within the scope
of their validly delegated authority, and which therefore are acts of the
state It does not shield governmental agents when they act outside of
powers legally possessed by them, nor, a fortiori, when they act outside
the powers possessed by the State itself, that is, as limited by the Con-
stitution 1 2 4 Such acts are individual acts and the governmental agents
committing them are individually responsible therefor
One of the leading Supreme Court cases on the distinction between
suits against governmental officers to restrain authorized acts, which
121 Ibid. 147 U S. 165, 171, 172
122 187 U S 94, 23 Sup Ct 33, 47 L ed 90 (1902)
222 Ibid 187 U. S 94, 108, 110; Santa Fe Pacific R R v. Fall, Secretary
of Interior, 259 U. S 197, 42 Sup Ct 466, 66 L ed 896 (1921); Poindexter
v Greenhow, 114 U S 270, 290, 5 Sup. Ct 903, 29 L. ed 185 (1884).
12 Payne, Secretary of the Interior v Central Pacific Ry, 255 U S
228, 41 Sup Ct 314, 65 L ed 598 (1921)
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are thus acts of the state, and suits to restrain the performance of un-
authorized acts, which are thus not really suits against the state, is
Ex Parte Young,125 in which the Supreme Court affirmed a decision
granting an injunction restraining the Attorney General of Minnesota
from enforcing an unconstitutional statute The Court disposed of
the Attorney General's contention that this was a suit against the State
by saying:
"The answer to this is the same as made in every case where
an official claims to be acting under the authority of the State
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce
be a violation of the Federal Constitution, the officer in pro-
ceeding under such enactment comes into conflict with the
superior authority of that Constitution, and he is in that case
stripped of his official or representative character and is sub-
jected in his person to the consequences of his individual con-
duct The State has no power to impart him any impunity from
responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States"
In Sterling v Constantin,12 6 the Supreme Court of the United States
held that the chief executive officer of a state, to-wit, the Governor, had
been properly enjoined from preserving law and order, as he conceived
it, by declaring martial law in certain oil-producing counties, when in
so doing he overstepped the limits of the Federal Constitution
A review of the cases in which courts either have or have not set
aside acts of administrative officials, indicates that governmental ad-
ministrative action cannot be enjoined at the whims and fancies of a
given individual or corporation However, it is also clear that in the
event a governmental officer or agent acts either outside the scope of
his authority or in disregard of the requirements of procedural due
process and a sufficient showing is made so as to cast substantial doubt
on the validity of his action and findings, the courts do and should
entertain jurisdiction The ratio decidendi of a number of the above
cases demonstrates that if the courts had been disposed to entertain
jurisdiction in the suits against Postmaster General Farley and to
enjoin the application of the cancellation order, there was ample pre-
cedent available for such a judicial determination
XI THE Am MAIL ROUTE CERTIFICATE CANCELLATION EXPERIENCE
VIEWED IN RETROSPECT
To recapitulate, the cancellation of the air mail route certificates pre-
vented the continued accumulation of huge profits by private enterprise,
and thereby effected economies for the benefit of the general American
public, prevented the repetition of fraud, such as accompanied the con-
struction of the railroads in this country, invoked the declaration of
policy embodied in the United States Revised Statutes Section 3950 to
15209 U S 123, 159, 160, 28 Sup Ct 441 52 L ed 714 (1907)
226287 U S 378, 53 Sup Ct 190, 77 L ed 375 (1932)
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prevent commercial air lines from combining to avoid competitive bid-
ding, caused reflection upon the wisdom of long term contracts, and
our whole contract and route certificate system for the transportation
of mail via airplanes Many of the results which flowed from the
cancellation are certainly desirable
Conceding that the cancellation of the air mail route certificates re-
sulted in equipping us to cope with air mail regulation more effectively;
many have deprecated the summary action by which the route cer-
tificates were swept aside, and have insisted that if excessive rates were
being paid, the Postmaster General could have reduced them without
the cancellation of the route certificates They have insisted that the
means used to attain the desired ends can scarcely be defended as
sound, just, equitable, and in consonance with American legal, consti-
tutional, and ethical principles and norms of conduct
Others, however, have considered the cancellation of the certificates
desirable, even though summary and of questionable legality, because
it gave an added impetus to the study of air mail and enabled Congress
to draft efficacious legislation relating to the whole subject of areo-
nautics 127
Now that over a decade has passed since the issuance of the cancella-
tion order and the partisan feelings which it generated have cooled, we
may view the whole picture with a sense of detachment and more
nearly see it in its true perspective It should be kept in mind that
during Brown's administration two controlling motives governed the
economic modus operandi of commercial air lines:
(1) To expand as fast as possible and to extend their area of opera-
tions within as much additional territory as possible
(2) To make demands upon Congress for additional air mail compen-
sation
Immediately preceding and at the time of the cancellation of the air
mail route certificates, the commercial air lines had to rely almost
entirely on air mail for revenue because there was relatively little pas-
senger business at that time Brown sought to keep down and reduce
the cost of transportation of air mail and to keep efficiency up Brown
asserted that the practice of the commercial air lines of seeking higher
air mail compensation from Congress must cease or the cost of tran's-
porting air mail would soon become prohibitive Brown did not believe
in cutthroat competition; he wanted to set up a self-contained system
of commercial air lines with sufficient volume of traffic to become self-
sustaining Brown felt that it was undesirable to have smali air lines
enter the field, and if such wildcat small air lines entered the field to
127 Hearings before Special Senate Investigating Committee-Investiga-




compete with the larger commerecial air lines which were already
operating, larger appropriations would be required for the transporta-
tion of air mail Therefore, Brown felt the introduction of small com-
mercial air lines in competition with the existing established air lines
would be inimical to the public interest
In order to implement these views Brown requested the holders of
air mail route certificates to come to the Post Office Department at
Washington, D C, for a conference regarding air mail, and former
air mail executives who attended the so-called May-June Spoils Con-
ferences and who do not wish to be quoted have now conceded that
they were summoned for the purpose of reaching an agreement upon
a division of territory among the commercial air lines for the trans-
portation of air mail However, the air mail executives have asserted
that since Brown called upon them to attend these conferences, they
were obliged to attend them, since the Postmaster General had the power
of life and death over them Yet the attempt to form such an agree-
ment, whether or not it was actually consummated, cannot be defended
under Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes even though Brown no
doubt was prompted by what he conceived to be most compatible with
the public interest The New Deal was quick to assail the attempt by
Brown to make any agreement for apportionment of territory in con-
travention of Section 3950 of the Revised Statutes as being contrary to
the public interest Unquestionably both Brown and Farley were moved
by what they conceived to be a high conception of the public interest,
but both shared divergent viewpoints of how the public interest could
best be served in the transportation of air mail under existing law
Brown was ahead of his time in his conception of the regulation of air
mail transportation, and his views eventually came to be accepted by the
inclusion of provision for issuance of route certificates in the Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938 which marked a sharp departure from the
philosophy of competitive bidding in air mail transportation, but
Brown was not clothed with authority by Congress to carry out his
views for the restriction of competition in air mail transportation
during his administration
While the Constitution of the United States contains no prohibition
against impairment of the obligation of contracts by the federal gov-
ernment, no affirmative express or implied power has been granted to
Congress to impair the obligations of a contract between private parties
by direct legislation, save when rights have been reserved, in the exercise
of the police power, and by the enactment of uniform laws on the
subject of bankruptcy Nor has any such power been conferred upon
the Executive Department, either expressly or by implication, by the
Constitution, and the federal government is, of course, subject to the
"due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Consti-
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tution These restrictions operate upon legislative as well as executive
power, and require that the rules of procedural due process be observed
Administrative officials of the United States Government enjoy a
favored position because they are discharging governmental functions,
dealing with government property, and necessarily are performing dis-
cretionary acts in which the courts are reluctant to substitute their
judgment for that of the duly constituted administrative official In
the light of this fact administrative officials should be solicitous to satisfy
the requirements of procedural due process and if administrators desire
to have a sense of finality attach to their quasi-judicial determinations
and to have them command respect and public confidence, in the event
there is doubt in the mind of the administrative official as to whether,
under constitutional and/or statutory provisions, notice and hearing
must precede administrative action, the doubt should be resolved in
favor of the private citizen
If the findings of executive officers and the departments of the govern-
ment are to be regarded as final, not only must the essential requisites
of due process be complied with, but also appropriate administrative
machinery must be instituted and manned by competent personnel with
unimpeachable integrity who will command the confidence of litigants
and parties appearing before them, and of the public generally In the
discharge of their quasi-legislative duties, administrators must order
their affairs so as to consider both divergent viewpoints and what seems
right to the community at large in the formulation of policies The dis-
charge of quasi-judicial functions must be characterized by a determina-
tion to be guided only by objective criteria in decision-making 128
The decisions reached by quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial bodies
and by administrative officers, such as the Post Office Department and
the Postmaster General, will be more favorably received and respected
if the elements of due process are adhered to, and administrative pro-
cedings are judiciously conducted so as to reflect a complete and fair
administrative consideration and sound and well-considered delibera-
tion The utilization of informal procedures is not incompatible with
proper administrative process, but too great celerity of determination
may result in an incorrect determination, and accuracy should not be
sacrificed to speed unless the situation at hand is a most compelling
one, requiring immediate attention Courts should not be hesitant to
set aside administrative action even though it involves interference with
administrative discretion if the exercise of that discretion has not been
preceded or accompanied by a scrupulous observance of the constitu-
tional and/or statutory requirements of procedural due process
In an era which is witnessing the exit of laissez faire philosophy in
2'8 C J FzRnmRic and EDWARD S MAsoN, PuBLic PoLIcy, Cambridge,
Harvard University Press (1940) 1-24
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no small measure, it is not only sound policy, but also just and equitable
that the doctrine of governmental immunity should continue to recede
still further in order that private persons, companies, and corporations
who hold contracts with the federal government may seek and obtain
more seasonable relief than is afforded in many instances at the present
time No executive officer of the government, however high his position,
should be permitted to set law at defiance with impunity Procedural
due process should be strictly adhered to by the government in all its
contractual relations with private enterprise, and the government of the
United States should be solicitous to adhere to its contractual com-
mitments to prevent a miscarriage of justice, to inspire public confidence
with respect to governmental contracts, and to maintain a high moral
tone in contractual relations between the United States Government
and its citizens
It was in the Court of Claims that the holders of the air mail route
certificates had their first opportunity to present the question of due
process, since the constitutional courts referred the air mail litigants
to their remedy in the Court of Claims Nevertheless the Court of
Claims did not rule on the due-process-notice-and-hearing question,
even though it was squarely presented to it for a ruling Even if the
Court of Claims had passed on this question, that would not have satis-
fied the requirements of procedural due process with respect to quasi-
judicial administrative determinations, for with respect to such quasi-
judicial as distinguished from quasi-legislative determinations, notice
and hearing must be accorded before the administrative body which
makes the determination, except in cases involving the exercise of the
police power, such as for the regulation of the public health, public
morals, and the public safety, or seizure of property by reason of public
necessity during war
Surveying the whole air mail cancellation picture in retrospect, it
seems that we could have made the progress we have made in air mail
regulation and aeronautic administration without the summary whole-
sale cancellation of contracts and air mail route certificates without
notice and hearing The air mail certificate cancellation experience
should serve to remind administrators and administrative agencies that
they should not lose sight of the fact that they are creatures of statute,
and should not assume powers with which they have not been clothed
True, the public interest must be subserved and public rights must be
protected, and therefore, at times, cancellation of government contracts
may become necessary, but it must also be remembered that individual
rights must not just be brushed aside In view of the fact that legal
remedies against administrative invasions of individual rights are very
limited, courts should be very vigilant to insure that adequate recognition
is given to procedural safeguards by administrative officials, and that the
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requirements of procedural due process are observed While it is con-
ceded that the air mail route certificates could have been canceled on
grounds other than fraud or the elimination of competitive bidding,
yet since these fact6rs were the fundamental reasons for the cancella-
tion, the requirements of due process should have been complied with
prior to cancellation The issuance of the cancellation order not only
reflected a departure from the moral canons which should characterize
governmental action, but also a gross and unlawful violation of pro-
cedural due process under the Fifth Amendment of the Federal Con-
stitution
It is to be hoped that as a result of the air mail route certificate can-
cellation experience, in the future, if administrative officials feel the
public interest requires the cancellation of governmental contracts or
route certificates, the esseniial elements of procedural due process will
be carefully observed The air mail cancellation experience has poig-
nantly demonstrated that a respect and scrupulous regard by admin-
istrative officials of the federal government of the requirements of
procedural due process in the future in cases circumstanced as were
the air mail contracts and air mail route certificates, will be a Whole-
some and constructive force in American life
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